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THE COSTS OF EASY VICTORY
MICHAEL E. WATERSTONE*
ABSTRACT
Studies of law and social change often focus on areas of intense
conflict, including abortion, gun rights, and various issues around
race, gender, and sexual orientation. Each of these has entered the
culture wars, inspiring fierce resistance and organized counter-
movements. A reasonable assumption might be that social change in
less controversial areas might be easier. In this Article, I suggest that
it is not that simple. Using the disability rights movement, I demon-
strate how flying under the radar leads to unappreciated obstacles.
The disability rights movement had a relatively easy path to the
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), an omnibus
federal civil rights law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability. Disability rights were not an issue of major public impor-
tance when the ADA was passed; the vast majority of people were
completely unaware of the law’s passage. Moving forward, to the
extent awareness of the ADA exists, it has centered on public and
judicial trepidation over granting what is perceived as some form of
benefit, for which there has not been an extensive public dialogue, to
a large and amorphous category of people, many of whom have no
natural claim to any history of discrimination. Thus, a new way to
understand the ADA’s inability to make more progress on some of its
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more transformational goals is the limited socio-legal conflict around
disability rights, combined with the expansive categories of people
the ADA intended to cover. It is hard to transform society if society
is not paying sufficient attention.
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INTRODUCTION
Studies of law and social change often focus on areas of intense
conflict, including abortion, gun rights, and various issues around
race, gender, and sexual orientation. Each of these has entered the
culture wars, inspiring fierce resistance and organized countermove-
ments. A reasonable assumption might be that social change in less
controversial areas is easier. In this Article, I suggest that it is not
that simple. Using the disability rights movement, I demonstrate
how flying under the radar leads to unappreciated obstacles. This
is especially the case when, as with disability, the category of people
who are claiming rights is ambiguous and includes individuals with
no apparent claim to a history of discrimination. 
Seeking to transform the social and political order, various
individual disability-specific communities unified in the 1970s to
create the modern disability rights movement. This approach pro-
vided increased political power, making federal omnibus civil rights
legislation possible. The most notable examples are the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA),1 and, when the judiciary responded
with narrowing interpretations, the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA).2 In so doing, the movement
consciously adopted the civil rights framework, patterning their
efforts on social movements built up around race and gender. They
envisioned their struggle as one for equality and rights. At the same
time, consistent with the collective approach, advocates turned away
from focused constitutional rights claiming, instead pursuing a
broad range of federal legislative rights at once. 
In previous work, I examined how the disability rights movement
has avoided state and federal constitutional claims and suggested
areas where constitutional claiming on behalf of discrete groups
within the disability rights movement might provide meaningful
doctrinal gains.3 In this Article, while moving away from discussing
specific legal claims, I continue the inquiry into how the social
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
2. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
3. See Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 529
(2014).
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movement for people with disabilities has and continues to influ-
ence how rights are expressed and implemented. Somewhat unique
amongst identity-based social movements, disability has stayed
away from the culture wars. Being less divisive, and less threaten-
ing, disability rights do not inspire the same values conflicts as
many other groups. Disability is also a more amorphous group iden-
tity than that found in other civil rights movements. The many
different groups and categories of people with disabilities that joined
together to help secure passage of the ADA, and are covered by its
broad protections, are not necessarily natural allies, nor are there
similar levels of public support and understanding for what these
different constituencies might urge in the name of equality.4
Although low political salience can be a useful asset to get legis-
lation passed, and broad identity might increase political strength,
both of these features have influenced and continue to influence the
disability rights project in previously unexamined and interrelated
ways. To the extent that the disability rights movement saw the
ADA as having the potential to create certain types of transforma-
tive change, such change may be unrealistic without engaging in
more of an intergenerational, multidimensional, and intense socio-
legal conflict than that which preceded the passage or even the
implementation of the ADA. Especially in an area like disability
that asks for resource redistributions, society cannot be transformed
if it is not paying sufficient attention. To the extent people are
engaged with the idea of disability rights at all, their attention is
focused on the (perceived) dubious claims of individuals at the outer
edges of what the ADA covers. But because the ADA links these
disparate groups, this negative attention impacts the entire
movement.
It is axiomatic that social and political debates influence law. A
growing body of literature examines the interactions between social
movements, the public, the legislature, and courts, to chart how
different groups construct their constitutional cultures.5 Much of
4. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011)
(discussing ways to move forward after “litigation loss” in marriage equality); Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 373, 377 (2007) (discussing abortion); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L.
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this work focuses on groups and claims in areas of intense social
conflict—including race, gender, sexual orientation, and even gun
rights. This body of work demonstrates that, in addition to multi-
level advocacy in pursuit of their goals, these movements experi-
enced dedicated countermovements, appeals to actors outside each
side’s core constituency, repeat players, and trips to the Supreme
Court that further mobilized key players on either side. Often, these
battles occurred in all branches of state and federal government.6 As
part of a continuous feedback loop between social movements, legis-
latures (both state and federal), and courts, the judiciary reflects at
least in part what is happening in these other spaces. Conflict
guides and focuses these constitutional conversations. Although the
disability rights movement patterned itself after several of these
REV. 1323, 1323 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Culture] (discussing how “equal
protection doctrine prohibiting sex discrimination was forged in the Equal Rights
Amendment’s defeat”); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitu-
tionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dead or Alive] (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court’s originalist interpretation of the Second Amendment); Reva B.
Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 74-
75 (2013) [hereinafter Siegel, Equality Divided] (discussing a constitutional conception of
race). For an example of a comprehensive treatment of several of these categories, see JACK
M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011). I use
the term “constitutional culture” because the literature primarily studies claims for consti-
tutional rights. But, in their discussions about rights claiming and conflict, scholars also
address (although they do not always emphasize) legislative reform efforts. See Siegel,
Equality Divided, supra, at 75 n.383; see also Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudence of the
Legislated Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 79, 83, 86-87 (Jack M. Balkin &
Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
6. This literature splits on the role and even utility of backlash to Court decisions articu-
lating or rejecting claims for constitutional rights. One group of scholars posits that Court
decisions in areas of intense social disagreement generate backlash that is harmful to the
democratic order. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can
Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1312 (2005)
(exploring the backlash caused by Roe v. Wade). Contested social change is therefore better
left to the legislative branch. Others view the backlash to judicial decisions as just a different
species of political pushback, explaining that we can understand key Court decisions only as
a result of the movement conflict that preceded them. See Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the
Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153,
1219 (2009) (applying this concept to marriage equality). Some scholars go further and stake
out the ground that popular reaction to contested Court decisions is actually productive,
making the entire constitutional process more democratic and even redemptive. See BALKIN,
supra note 5, at 5-6. In a companion piece to this Article, I attempt to situate the disability
rights movement in the context of that debate. See Michael Waterstone, Backlash, Courts, and
Disability Rights, 95 B.U. L. REV. 833 (2015).
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movements both in terms of tactics and strategy, it has not really
been studied in this way.7 
Here, in examining how the social movement of people with
disabilities has influenced the evolution of rights, and continues to
do so, I make two claims. The first is that the conflict around dis-
ability rights is less intense, and thus fundamentally different, than
in several other identity-based civil rights movements. The ADA
was an ambitious statute, seeking to transform attitudes around
disability and the built environment and go deeply into the private
sector to bring people with disabilities into full citizenship. By using
a broad definition of disability, it potentially covered many different
types of individuals, many of whom had no natural claim to any
history of societal discrimination or stigma. Yet there was still
relatively little opposition to the ADA’s passage. There are many
reasons for this, ranging from a lack of animus toward disability
generally to the disability rights community’s intentional effort to
minimize public awareness of the new law in an effort to make
passage easier. 
Relatively speaking, the disability rights movement was then and
remains today important to only a small group of people. There is no
organized anti-disability movement, politicians do not regularly
take public stands on matters important to the disability commu-
nity, and views on disability issues are not a factor in judicial selec-
tion or confirmation. There are limited repeat players in disability
cases. This lack of conflict reflects low public engagement on disabil-
ity issues. Whereas the nation has the “conviction that an essential
mission of the federal government is the prevention of racial and
gender discrimination,”8 the ADA has been described as having
low political salience.9 There has certainly been what is commonly
7. Neither this body of work, nor the larger project of progressive constitutional
theorizing, address the disability rights movement or disability law. The anthology The
Constitution in 2020, and its larger online project, The Constitution in 2020, http://www.
constitution2020.org, do not include any specific discussion of disability. See THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); CONSTITUTION IN 2020,
http://www.constitution2020.org/ [http://perma.cc/8E52-9SZY] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
8. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (2003).
9. See id. (noting that “[i]n the years since Boerne the Court has used its new
enforcement model of Section 5 power primarily to invalidate statutes of relatively low
political salience” and citing a list which includes the Americans with Disabilities Act).
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described as a “judicial backlash” to the ADA, with judges at all
levels interpreting its provisions narrowly. But rather than
demonstrating opposition to the equality claims of many individuals
with what might be considered more serious disabilities, these cases
typically center on judicial trepidation over the disability category
getting too large.
My second claim is that the lower temperature conflict over
disability issues, combined with public and judicial concern over the
ambiguity of the category, shed new light on certain movement
disappointments. In studying backlash, constitutional and social
movement scholars have recently argued that intense conflict is a
necessary condition for certain types of social change.10 If vigorous
contestation helps us understand law, its absence should have an
impact as well. In many ways, the ADA has been a phenomenally
successful statute, creating a new world of opportunities for people
with disabilities. Other groups who have faced stiffer resistance in
their quest for rights certainly look longingly at the disability rights
movement’s avoidance of energetic countermobilization. No move-
ment gets everything it wants, as quickly as it believes it should, so
any criticisms of the ADA should be taken with a grain of salt. But
here I focus on two persistent and non-trivial critiques of the limits
of the ADA. For each, I attempt to use the low political salience,
combined with the large and artificial statutory group identity of
disability, to help shed light on the limits of what the ADA has been
able to accomplish. 
At a specific level, one of the goals of the ADA was to restructure
workplaces and, in so doing, increase the employment levels of
10. See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 5, at 81-82 (“[C]onflict is likely to be
protracted, and change, if any, slow. Advocates can deliberate about the best directions in
which to direct conflict of this kind, when opportunities permit choice; but it is hard to
imagine change of this kind without profound and sustained conflict.”); see also Douglas
NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 881-
82 (2013) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 5) (“Courts eventually validate meanings that have
become reasonable through the course of continued debate and persuasion. The new
constitutional meaning becomes authoritative not because a court decided so independently,
but because social movements have persuaded political forces, opinion leaders, the public, and
judges that a new position is reasonable and, in fact, correct.”) (internal citation omitted);
Reva B. Siegel, How Conflict Entrenched the Right to Privacy, 124 YALE L.J. F. 316 (2015),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/how-conflict-entrenched-the-right-to-privacy [http://
perma.cc/87DS-CNQE].
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people with disabilities.11 It is clear that this has not happened.
I argue here that, in addition to the other explanations that have
been offered in the literature, we must also consider that although
advocates believed that the ADA created specific policy features ca-
pable of moving the employment rate, this was not a widely shared
sentiment. This lack of engagement over some of these hard choices
made it unlikely that the ADA could do its part in the transforma-
tive work of moving more people with disabilities into the work-
place. 
More generally, many hoped that the ADA would create a new
way of thinking about disability; rather than a category to be pitied,
people with disabilities were entitled to full rights commensurate
with other civil rights groups.12 Advocates aimed to ingrain the so-
cial model of disability—in which disability is considered a socially
constructed category based on the interaction of personal impair-
ments with environmental features—into American policy and
notions of fairness. By calling physical and attitudinal barriers into
question, and requiring employers, governments, and businesses to
make choices to accommodate disability, the goal of the ADA, and
supportive progressive academics, was nothing less than a redefin-
ing of the very nature of equality. Proponents hoped to use the
ADA’s broad coverage to do in one fell swoop what other movements
had done in a piecemeal fashion. 
But I suggest this conversation has not really happened, at least
in part, because winning too easily has costs. Unguided by a public
conflict over these transformational aspirations, awareness of dis-
ability rights—to the extent there is such awareness at all—remains
rooted in a vision of special rights, not civil rights.13 ADA case law
reflects this understanding. Without public pressure pushing judges
in the direction disability advocates might hope, judges are free to
follow whatever prior beliefs they might have about disability. And
when the claim is on behalf of someone with what might be consid-
ered a marginal disability, and he or she asks for a redistribution of
resources, limited judicial interpretations make sense. Both the
11. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
13. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations
as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 606-07 (2004).
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judiciary and the public resisted the idea that a large and amor-
phous category of people might be entitled to some form of statutory
rights about which there had been limited public dialogue. The tra-
jectory of pursuing multiple federal rights at once through an omni-
bus federal statute, on behalf of a large and amorphous category of
people, without a history or parallel effort in state courts or legisla-
tures, proved a poor vehicle to articulate a vision of equality that
had the potential to capture the attention and imagination of those
outside the movement, either in support or opposition.14 
Using lower political salience and the broad definition of disabil-
ity as a new framework for understanding some limits of the ADA
can and should stimulate some additional, and perhaps difficult,
conversations. If conflict, public awareness, and public engagement
are linked, and disability remains something that incites passion in
only a small group of people, then a more appropriate movement
analogy, and area for future study, may be to groups like veterans
or the poor, rather than other more traditional civil rights groups.
Moreover, it suggests that the ADAAA—a legislative effort to lock
judges into a broad definition of disability—may not usher in a new
era of disability equality.15 Unconvinced as to why this (now larger)
universe of people are entitled to an employer-funded accommoda-
tion (itself not precisely defined), there may well be space for con-
tinued narrow interpretations that leave plaintiffs on the losing
end. This framework may also have implications for a prevailing
trend in disability rights scholarship that proceeds from the un-
stated assumption that the day will come when people will “get” dis-
ability rights (and by implication, judges will grant them) in the way
they do for other civil rights groups. In terms of the ADA-covered
14. To be clear, I am not making the claim that if the disability rights movement had
encountered more resistance and had somehow become more politically salient to a broader
range of people that the ADA would have necessarily been more effective at moving people
into the workplace, or that there would have been deeper penetration of the social model of
disability. Such a claim likely could not be proved. One possibility is that that the ADA might
never have passed in the first place. See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 5, at 75 (noting
that “conflict can slow or even crush change”). Another claim is that if the business
community had resisted more, a narrower definition of disability would have emerged. See
Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court
Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 542 (2008). 
15. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
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category of people with disabilities, this has not yet happened and
may never occur.
This Article proceeds in two Parts. Part I briefly discusses the
literature highlighting how feedback loops between judges, social
movements, and the public, as well as the intensity of conflict, influ-
ence law. It then contrasts the modern disability rights movement,
which I suggest is a history of political successes with relatively
minimal political conflict. In light of this, Part II considers a focus
on conflict and ambiguity in the group identity as a new framework
to understand some areas in which advocates and scholars view the
ADA as disappointing. It then concludes with some reflections on
how the new way of understanding the disability rights movement
can and should influence current and future debates on the move-
ment’s trajectory. 
I. CONFLICT AND SOCIAL CHANGE
A. The Role of Conflict in Pursuit of Rights
In areas like race, gender, sexual orientation, and gun rights,
among others, scholars have explored how rights and demands for
equality are created through feedback loops between social move-
ments, judges, legislatures, and even the public.16 These attempts
to change the existing legal, social, and political order typically in-
spire fierce resistance, generating organized countermovements
and fostering political debates.17 Law is forged through these con-
flicts. Even within the judiciary, law evolves not inevitably or even
rationally, but as a result of deliberate and complex social forces
16. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 549, 562 (2009); supra note 5; see also Cary Franklin, Discriminatory Animus 11
(Univ. of Tex. School of Law, Research Paper No. 554, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2401527 [http://perma.cc/5YPB-5KGL]; NeJaime, supra note 10, at
877.
17. See Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 374 (noting a process whereby citizens make claims
“about the Constitution’s meaning and ... oppose their government—through constitutional
lawmaking, electoral politics, and the institutions of civil society—when they believe that it
is not respecting the Constitution. Government officials, in turn, both resist and respond to
these citizen claims. These complex patterns of exchange have historically shaped the mean-
ing of our Constitution”). 
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exerting pressure on courts and judges.18 This is not a narrative of
pro-civil rights forces always winning—even when there are
victories, there is backlash and retrenchment. With both sides
pushing hard, law rarely evolves to anyone’s complete satisfaction.
Rather, this literature suggests that conflict is a useful and perhaps
necessary framework to understand the evolution of law, and that
a certain level of intensity attends major social change. 
Race and abortion are the classic examples of this phenomenon.
The conflict surrounding Brown v. Board of Education19 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, including protest, civil disobedience, and
violence, has been well documented.20 By the time the Civil Rights
Act was passed, “it was supported by a powerful and well-publicized
movement for social change, whose major tenets and aspirations
had already garnered widespread socio-cultural support.”21 Jumping
forward, when the Supreme Court became involved on key issues of
race, diverse groups paid attention and reacted: ninety-two amicus
briefs were filed in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, involving
a challenge to race-conscious admissions procedures.22 
This type of conflict is offered as one key to understanding law
and its development.23 So, for example, Professor Reva Siegel offers
an account of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Fisher and
18. See NeJaime, supra note 10, at 882 (“Important decisions become part of a narrative
in which social movement actors, among others, use such decisions to explain legitimate so-
cial change, repudiate past injustices, and justify calls for further development.”). 
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. See generally DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND
THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986); Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994).
21. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 476, 489 (2000).
22. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); see Mark Walsh, It Was Another Big Term for Amicus Curiae
Briefs at the High Court, ABA J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/it_was_another_big_term_for_amicus_curiae_briefs_at_the_high_court/
[http://perma.cc/37HU-WTEF]. On the relationship between amicus briefs being filed and
the political salience of Supreme Court decisions, see Vanessa A. Baird, The Effect of Polit-
ically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda, 66 J. POL. 755, 763-66 (2004). 
23. See NeJaime, supra note 10, at 881-82 (“Courts eventually validate meanings that
have become reasonable through the course of continued debate and persuasion.... The new
constitutional meaning becomes authoritative not because a court decided so independently,
but because social movements have persuaded political forces, opinion leaders, the public,
and judges that a new position is reasonable and, in fact, correct.”).
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Shelby County v. Holder24 as espousing a vision of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause that restricts judicial oversight of minorities while
intensifying judicial oversight of majority claims.25 Siegel’s premise
is that these decisions are not a result of doctrinal inevitability, but
rather are occasioned by a profound transformation “by the conflict
that enforcing equal protection provokes” and the “resistance the
civil rights project aroused.”26 She traces a conflict that “divided the
nation for decades,”27 and was the result of vigorous contestation in
public consciousness and the political process, expressed and rein-
forced by movement-countermovement dynamics.28 It is a history of
citizen mobilization and presidents responding with obvious
political commitments and selection of members of the federal
judiciary.29 In many instances, Supreme Court decisions, and the
positions Justices staked out within them, provided rallying points
around which the public and politicians could mobilize.30 Justices on
both sides then, in turn, reacted to these national conflicts and
disagreements.31 
Abortion followed a similar trajectory—law created as a result of
movement-countermovement dynamics and active contestation.
Even if one starts the story with Roe (which is surely not where it
begins), it is not an overstatement to say that the decision “inspired
a political campaign to prohibit abortion that changed the shape of
24. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
25. See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 5, at 61-62. 
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 7 (“As this examination of equal protection history shows, equal protection law
has been profoundly shaped by the conflicts it has engendered.”). 
29. Id. at 8 (“Changes in the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause may reflect the
workings of a democratic order in which citizens can mobilize for constitutional change, and
Presidents—courting voters—can nominate as judges persons believed to have compatible
views about the great constitutional controversies of their day.”). Professor Siegel traces the
evolution of these decisions to public positions taken by Presidents Nixon and Reagan, and
in particular, the actions of the Department of Justice in the Reagan Administration, which
sowed the seeds of their vision of equal protection jurisprudence. See id. at 11 (Nixon’s speech
against busing); id. at 16 n.72 (appointment of judges); id. at 25-29 (on the Reagan Justice
Department’s “connect[ing] debates over intent and effects to the debate over affirmative
action and treat[ing] both questions as crucial matters of concern in judicial appointments”). 
30. Id. at 19 (on role of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Personnel Admin-
istrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)).
31. Id. at 23 (on Justice Powell “[i]nvoking the national conflict over desegregation” in
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 489 (1979)).
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both constitutional politics and constitutional law.”32 This pushback,
and subsequent debate, unfolded on multiple fronts: in popular
culture, political parties and campaigns, judicial nominations, ju-
dicial proceedings, and the legislature.33 Social movement forces
have helped frame and solidify the constitutional values guarantee-
ing and protecting abortion rights.34 And passions can even rise to
the point of violence.35 
Similar accounts are offered for marriage equality, gender dis-
crimination, and an individual right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment. There were many points along the social and legal
continuum of the LGBT movement and path to marriage equality:
violence at Stonewall,36 to Bowers v. Hardwick,37 to Baehr v.
Lewin,38 to the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),39 to Lawrence v.
Texas,40 to United States v. Windsor.41 Each was both the cause and
result of movement-countermovement strategies and multilevel
political, popular, and legal contestation. Further, each point
represented an opportunity for the different sides to regroup,
reorganize, and renew their effort to shape the hearts and minds
of the public.42 Familiar adversaries continued to square off in
32. Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 398.
33. Id. at 399 (“Roe has accordingly been tested by innumerable statutes that probe its
reach and attack its normative underpinnings.”). 
34. See Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims that Engendered Roe, 90
B.U. L. REV. 1875 (2010) (examining “understandings animating feminist abortion rights
claims in the years before Roe”).
35. See Planned Parenthood Se., Inc., v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1333 (M.D. Ala.
2014) (“[T]his court cannot overlook the backdrop to this case: a history of severe violence
against abortion providers in Alabama and the surrounding region.”). 
36. See Symposium, Introduction: Stonewall at 25, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277, 277-82
(1994).
37. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
38. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), reconsideration and clarification granted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993).
39. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
40. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
41. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
42. See Steven A. Boutcher, Making Lemonade: Turning Adverse Decisions into
Opportunities for Mobilization, 13 AMICI 8, 10-11 (2005); Gwendolyn M. Leachman, From
Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT Movement’s Agenda, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1667, 1679-80 (2014) (noting how in the mid-1980s gay and lesbian political organizing had
shifted dramatically in response to the challenge of the reinvigorated anti-gay religious right);
NeJaime, supra note 5, at 985 (commenting on work of Steven Boutcher, and noting that “[h]e
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multiple fora.43 Fueled by visible conflict, public awareness and
public perception shifted and peaked.44 By the time Windsor arrived
at the Supreme Court, the issues had “divided the nation for de-
cades.”45 Again, Supreme Court action provided the impetus for
reaction, which engaged the public and mobilized further legal
development.46 The Court was not ruling in a vacuum; rather, it was
part of a conversation characterized by “ferocious reaction[s],”47
which in turn “moved from the legislature, to the streets, to the
courts, to popular referenda, and culminated in a trial, in which
nationally renowned advocates presented arguments, honed through
years of struggle, to a national audience.”48 The Court’s recent
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, holding same-sex marriage to be a
constitutionally protected interest, may have resolved that particu-
lar doctrinal question, although it explicitly recognized the multi-
tiered advocacy in pursuit of that goal.49 And all signals are that the
same divergent interests will continue repeated and high-profile
engagements on issues of individual rights against religious liberty,
shows that the Bowers defeat increased grassroots moblilization, fundraising, and organiza-
tional founding, all of which proved vital to a stronger LGBT-rights movement”); Schacter,
supra note 6, at 1154.
43. See NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1003 (“Christian Right advocates have used the ballot-
initiative process to turn back LGBT gains deriving from all branches of government. Indeed,
LGBT-rights lawyers themselves understand backlash to judicial decisions as part of this
broader movement-countermovement phenomenon.”). 
44. See Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 400 (“Whereas in 1987, 55% of Americans thought
that homosexuality between consenting adults should not be legal and 33% thought that it
should be legal, by 2001 these numbers had virtually switched: 54% of Americans thought
that homosexual relations should be legal and only 42% thought that they should be illegal.”);
see also Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 5, at 76 (“Evolving public opinion enabled this
Term’s marriage decisions, but conflict over law importantly contributed to the public’s chang-
ing views.”); id at 85 (“Yet the public’s evolving views about marriage were also importantly
the fruit of conflict over, and through, law.”). The heavy involvement amongst interest groups
and political elites can be demonstrated, at least in part, by the number of amicus briefs filed
in Hollingsworth v. Perry—ninety-six, the most of the term. See Walsh, supra note 22.
45. Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 5, at 5.
46. See, e.g., Leachman, supra note 42, at 1678-79 (noting the relationship between
Bowers, a reinvigorated anti-gay religious right, and the subsequent response and unification
of the gay rights community).
47. See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 5, at 80.
48. Id. at 85.
49. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597-98 (2015).
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with those on the religious right adopting the tactics of their adver-
saries.50
The constitutional jurisprudence of gender discrimination can
also be understood only through the lens of multilevel conflict. In
the 1970s, an initial groundswell of support for the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) met “energized countermobilization,” which
eventually doomed its passage.51 Politicians at all levels of govern-
ment weighed in, and organized groups like STOPERA, with
burgeoning national figures like Phyllis Schlafly, were born and
thrived.52 This in turn drove the women’s rights movement to new
levels of messaging and organization.53 These debates, though ulti-
mately unsuccessful in creating a constitutional amendment, im-
pacted how courts interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, such
that scholars began to consider the resulting body of equal protec-
tion jurisprudence as a de facto ERA.54 Cases like Reed v. Reed and
Frontiero v. Richardson developed a theory of gender discrimination
that could directly trace its lineage to arguments and advocacy
developed in the battles over the ERA.55
The same principle explains decisions in other areas as well.
Scholars offer an account of the Supreme Court’s decision in District
of Columbia v. Heller, protecting an individual’s right to bear arms
50. See Adam B. Lerner, Conservatives Regroup After Gay Marriage Defeat, POLITICO (July
12, 2015, 7:53 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/conservatives-regroup-after-gay-
marriage-defeat-119984.html [http://perma.cc/8A6D-ZXVZ] (noting that conservatives are
adopting the framework of discrimination pursued by advocates for marriage equality).
51. See Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 5, at 1378-79 (“[W]ithin a few years, the
groundswell of support for the ERA had provoked energetic countermobilization. Opposition
began with impassioned debate over the ERA’s meaning that transpired before Congress was
willing to enact it—and grew more heated as the decade wore on.”).
52. See, e.g., CAROL FELSENTHAL, THE SWEETHEART OF THE SILENT MAJORITY: THE
BIOGRAPHY OF PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY 244 (1981) (“In Illinois, for example, she could rally a
thousand women for a routine demonstration .... And that was nothing because, all told, she
had twenty thousand people working for her in the state.”); Symposium, Men, Women, and
the Constitution: The Equal Rights Amendment, 10 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 77, 110 (1973)
(observing that Schlafly was “very well funded, and she ha[d] coordinated some ‘grass roots’
groups all over the country that started emerging .... They [were] active with pickets and
placards at legislative sessions, sometimes slowing the progress of the amendment”).
53. See Symposium, supra note 52, at 110 (“Luckily, a good counterattack is being
mounted by groups like B.P.W. and Common Cause.”). 
54. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457, 1476-77 (2001).
55. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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against federal gun control regulation, as reflecting the work of
social movement actors to change American minds about the mean-
ing of the Second Amendment.56 Challenging a view of Heller as a
“triumph of originalism,”57 Professor Siegel argues that the decision
“enforces understandings of the Second Amendment that were
forged in the late twentieth century through popular constitution-
alism.”58 She traces Heller’s holding to express social movement
strategy, advocacy, and contestation, thus situating it as one of
many decisions where “in American constitutional culture, social
movement conflict can motivate as well as discipline new claims
about the Constitution’s meaning, and how responsive interpreta-
tion by public officials can transmute constitutional politics into
new forms of constitutional law.”59
Although there is some disagreement about the proper role of the
courts in mediating these disputes, as opposed to that of the legis-
latures,60 the diverse literature supports an understanding of law
both through the prism of social movement conflict and through an
intense disagreement and debate over claims for rights that ac-
company swings of law. 
B. Disability is Different
On one account—perhaps the dominant view in disability law
scholarship—the trajectory of disability law can map onto this con-
flict and backlash narrative. Advocates lobbied fiercely for passage
of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Businesses fought back and
helped create limited interpretations of the law, particularly on its
56. 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008); see Jack Balkin, “This Decision Will Cost American Lives”:
A Note on Heller and the Living Constitution, BALKINIZATION (June 27, 2008), http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/this-decision-will-cost-american-lives.html [http://perma.cc/4B
RD-3BHQ] (“[T]he result in Heller would have been impossible without ... social movement
actors who, over a period of about 35 years, succeeded in changing Americans’ minds about
the meaning of the Second Amendment.”).
57. See Lawrence Solum, Analysis of Heller, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (June 26, 2008), http://
lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/06/analysis-of-hel.html [http://perma.cc/Z75R-6MMF]
(“It is difficult to imagine a clearer or more thoroughgoing endorsement of original public
meaning originalism.”). 
58. See Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra note 5, at 192.
59. Id. at 201.
60. See supra note 5.
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threshold definition of disability.61 Indeed, there is an active
backlash literature attempting to explicate the extent to which the
judiciary undermined the law’s original intent.62 This work recog-
nizes assertions that the pushback or backlash to disability rights
was akin to that faced by other civil rights groups.63 
In contrast to these conventional accounts, my argument high-
lights a significant difference in kind between the conflict created by
the ADA’s passage and the ways in which certain other groups,
several of which the disability rights movement consciously pat-
terned itself after, have constructed their constitutional cultures.
Furthermore, the diffuse and ambiguous nature of group identity
has complicated public and judicial understandings of disability
equality. Below, I will explore how these features offer a new frame-
61. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002) (holding that an
exception to seniority policy was not a reasonable accommodation); Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1999) (holding that an individual with amblyopia, an
uncorrectable eye condition, was not covered by the ADA’s definition of disability); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999) (holding that twin sisters with myopia were
not covered by the ADA’s definition of disability).
62. The seminal work in this literature was a dedicated issue of the Berkeley Journal of
Employment and Labor Law, which was the result of a 1999 gathering of scholars from the
fields of law, sociology, psychology, political science, economics, history, and English literature
investigating the idea of ADA backlash. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and
the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000) (“A final account of the
pattern in ADA decisions is the one suggested by the title of this symposium: that there is
some kind of judicial backlash against the ADA. The term ‘backlash’ suggests a hostility to
the ADA .... The backlash thesis suggests that judges are not simply confused by the ADA;
rather, they are resistant to it. It suggests that the courts are systematically nullifying rights
that Congress conferred on people with disabilities.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Fore-
word—Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social
Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 12 (2000). See generally BACKLASH
AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003)
(collecting and expanding upon articles presented at the symposium).
63. See Diller, supra note 62, at 44 (“[P]eople with disabilities find themselves on the front
lines of a legal and cultural war.”); see also Marta Russell, Backlash, the Political Economy,
and Structural Exclusion, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335, 335 (2000) (“[J]ust as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 produced a backlash by those who feared that minorities and women would
take jobs away from them, the ADA has been subject to recent backlash by the public, our
elected officials, and the courts.”). 
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work for understanding some of the ADA’s jurisprudence.64 But first,
I demonstrate that a meaningful difference does exist. 
In terms of the category composition, although no movement is
monolithic, and all of the groups discussed have internal divisions,65
the disability community is perhaps exceptional in its diffuseness.
For the most part, the “movement” is made up of individual commu-
nities of people built around shared life experiences with specific im-
pairments. Historically, these different groups have not had much
in common and have not worked together (or even gotten along) as
a social or political matter.66 Starting in the 1970s, though, distinct
64. There has been scholarly work looking at what happens to a movement after it secures
either a judicial or legislative victory. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 33-41 (1978); MICHAEL W.
MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION
1-2 (1994); Jennifer Gordon, A Movement in the Wake of a New Law: The United Farm
Workers and the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 277, 291-97 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006). In exploring why
these changes (usually judicial, but sometimes legislative) are not as successful as advocates
have hoped, the typical challenges identified are “bureaucratic resistance to implementing
new rules and procedures, the dominance of opponents in determining the regulations that
will govern the new right, and the technicalization and lawyerization of the movement’s
fight.” Gordon, supra, at 292. Some work has looked at these factors in the context of the dis-
ability rights movement. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights
Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2006) (private enforce-
ment); Lisa Eichhorn, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing Around the
EEOC’s “Disability” Regulations Under the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 177, 209 (2004)
(role of administrative agencies); Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement,
92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 444-55 (2007) (public enforcement). The focus here, however, is
somewhat different and pushes that literature in an additional direction—exploring a lower-
grade conflict at the law’s founding and thereafter, combined with category ambiguity, to
explain frustration with movement goals.
65. To the extent that movements give the appearance of unified voices, it is most likely
a result of some voices being quashed and others being privileged. See TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN,
COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1-2
(2011); see also Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era
Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 289-90 (2005).
66. See, e.g., GARY L. ALBRECHT, THE DISABILITY BUSINESS: REHABILITATION IN AMERICA
281 (1992) (“These diverse groups, while sharing common interests, do not constitute a united
lobby. Rather they seek their own objectives, often competing with one another for resour-
ces.”); SHARON BARNARTT & RICHARD SCOTCH, DISABILITY PROTESTS: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS
1970-1999, at 109-38 (2001) (discussing unity and disunity within the disability rights
movement and noting differences between lived experiences and political goals); JOSEPH P.
SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 126
(1993) (“There are hundreds of different disabilities, and each group tended to see its issues
in relation to its specific disability. There were groups for people with head injuries, different
groups for blind people, and still others for cancer survivors or those with diabetes, arthritis,
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undertakings—such as the independent living movement, the dein-
stitutionalization movement, parent efforts toward inclusive educa-
tion, the rise of AIDS activists, and the merging of the culturally
deaf into the larger disability movement—began slow and tentative
steps toward a pan-disability model.67 This “big tent” iteration of the
disability rights movement is directly tied to the expansive defini-
tion of disability adopted in the ADA and recommitted to in the
ADAAA. But it is important that this unification not be overstated:
there were and remain significant divisions across and even within
groups.68
Two important efforts unified these disparate groups, one involv-
ing tactics and the other, ideology. The disability rights movement
consciously sought to come together as a civil rights movement,
using the imagery and unifying framework of civil rights.69 Like race
and gender before them, people with disabilities sought to cast
themselves as a minority seeking to be free of persecution and
discrimination to live free lives.70 People with disabilities would be
active holders of rights as opposed to passive recipients of medical
learning disabilities, and mental illness, all fighting for specific programs, funding, and laws
to address the needs of members of their own group.”); JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER,
DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISABILITY POLICY AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 71 (2003)
(noting views of Richard Scotch “that until the mid-1970s the disability rights movement was
a loosely structured grassroots movement.”).
67. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 14-18 (2009); see also Michael Ashley Stein et al., Cause Lawyering for People with
Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1667 (2010) (reviewing BAGENSTOS, supra).
68. See SWITZER, supra note 66, at 77 (noting differences between the National Federation
for the Blind, which did not support the ADA, and the American Council of the Blind, which
did). In American Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 2006), the
American Council of the Blind challenged paper currency as being inaccessible and thus
violating section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The National Federation for the Blind filed an
amicus brief opposing the American Council of the Blind’s position. See Brief for National
Federation of the Blind as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 1-3, Am. Council of the
Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5063).
69. See SWITZER, supra note 66, at 68-69 (describing protest at Gallaudet University over
the appointment of a hearing president as a defining civil rights event); see also 135 CONG.
REC. 19,807 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“The Americans with Disabilities Act ... has
the potential to become one of the great civil rights laws of our generation.”).
70. See SWITZER, supra note 66, at 76 (“One of the slogans often associated with disability
activism is ‘Nothing About Us Without Us’—a phrase that has parallel significance with ‘Pow-
er to the People’ in the civil rights movement and, for many in the women’s liberation move-
ment, ‘Our Bodies, Ourselves.’”).
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expertise and/or charity.71 In addition to empowering people with
disabilities, this framework brought with it political power, espe-
cially when it included more groups into the fold.72 Ideologically,
people with disparate disabilities could collectively get behind the
social model of disability: the idea that disability is an interaction
between an individual’s impairment and society’s response to that
impairment.73 The policy payoff was that this framework opened up
a whole range of social choices as themselves contributing to disa-
bility.74
These tactics and ideology served as forces to unify the movement
internally, which proved important to gather political power to pur-
sue an omnibus federal civil rights law. The goal, as with other civil
rights groups, was to “recognize the equal ‘status and dignity’ of
persons who live in entrenched relations of inequality.”75 Given the
expansive nature of the category, and the large number of rights
sought, perhaps more resistance would have been expected. Yet
none of the hallmarks of the type of backlash discussed above oc-
curred—no violence, countermobilization, entrenchment, maneuver-
ing for public awareness, or repeated engagement. In contrast, the
modern disability rights movement is a case study of political suc-
cess with relatively minimal political conflict. 
Though the passage of the ADA certainly resulted from a con-
certed political effort, it was not borne out of any high public
awareness of, or values clash over, the inclusion, or lack thereof, of
71. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil
Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 343 (2001) (“The ADA’s proponents were—and
are—careful to highlight not only the differences between the ‘civil rights’ and ‘medical’
approaches to dealing with the problem of disability, but the differences between the ‘civil
rights’ and ‘charitable’ approaches.”); see also Diller, supra note 62, at 31-32 (“The ADA
explicitly adopts a civil rights approach to the problems that people with disabilities
encounter in the workplace.... The legislative findings that form the preamble to the Act draw
on the concepts and rhetoric identified with legal remedies for violations of civil rights.”).
72. See, e.g., Richard K. Scotch, Politics and Policy in the History of the Disability Rights
Movement, 67 MILBANK Q. 380, 384 (1989) (arguing that the ability of the disability rights
movement to pass legislation is largely due to a change in a “rights issue orientation” and
participation in the larger disability rights movement instead of individual silos); see also
SWITZER, supra note 66, at 71-74.
73. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 67, at 18-20 (noting the unifying effects of the social model
and civil rights framework).
74. Id. at 20.
75. See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 5, at 74.
608 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:587
people with disabilities in society.76 At the time advocates were
gearing up to make the push for omnibus civil rights protections,
disability rights were not “on the public’s radar screen or anyone’s
political agenda.”77 The “policy window” was not opened primarily
by a public recognition of the need for legislative civil rights action
for people with disabilities, but instead as part of a reaction to the
regulatory reform movement that had reached new heights under
President Reagan.78 Thus, the initial legislative mobilizing force was
at least as much a defensive maneuver to safeguard regulations un-
der section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act from the threat of deregu-
lation, as it was a value-driven push for transformative change.79
The debates in Congress about the ADA were, for the most part,
not about any disability animosity or objections to the theoretical
benefits of integrating people with disabilities into society. They
were about cost.80 There were concerns about creating a bonanza
for plaintiff ’s lawyers who would bring suits against defendants
who could not afford to litigate them.81 Some members of Congress
76. For more comprehensive treatments of movement politics, see SWITZER, supra note
66, at 68-89; Arlene Mayerson, The History of the ADA: A Movement Perspective, in
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL
AMERICANS 17, 17-24 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993); Sara D. Watson, A
Study in Legislative Strategy: The Passage of the ADA, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra, at 25, 25-34.
77. See SWITZER, supra note 66, at 96; see also Krieger, supra note 21, at 489 (“[T]he
Americans with Disabilities Act  was [not] supported by a broad-based popular understanding
of the injustices faced by people with disabilities, the nature of their continuing struggle for
inclusion and equality, or the particular theory of equality that informed the statutes’ many
ambiguous provisions.”); Watson, supra note 76, at 26 (“No public opinion poll had highlighted
disability discrimination as a major issue; no new publication had captured the public’s
attention; no crisis had emerged to spur legislators to action; no data had suddenly emerged
to indicate a dramatic increase in problematic behavior; and no media exposé had taken
place.”). 
78. See SWITZER, supra note 66, at 96.
79. See Mayerson, supra note 76, at 19.
80. See SWITZER, supra note 66, at 106. For example, Senator Orrin Hatch offered a floor
amendment, which was ultimately defeated, seeking to have a refundable tax credit of up to
$5000 to help small businesses comply with the public accommodations provision. See 135
CONG. REC. 19,836 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[W]e have to recognize that Federal
requirements cost money and some of these people cannot afford to come up with that
money.”). Similarly, the National Federation of Independent Business voiced objections that
the ADA would be difficult for small businesses to comply with. See SWITZER, supra note 66,
at 109 (describing the role of the National Federation of Independent Business). Trade
associations for hotels and mass retail offered similar testimony. Id. at 109-10.
81. See James Bovard, The Lame Game, AM. SPECTATOR, July 1995, at 30, 32-33; see also
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feared that those who used illegal drugs, as well as homosexuals,
might be covered by the ADA.82 Looking through the legislative
record confirms that even libertarian opposition to the ADA tended
to be more of the utilitarian critique centering on “cost and (in)effi-
ciency,” not a deontological libertarian critique based on freedom of
association.83 Stated differently, these concerns expressed them-
selves in economic terms (“Who is going to pay for this?”) rather
than value judgments or animus (“I do not want to associate with
these people.”).84 
These statements reflect the nature of socio-political resistance to
disability. Disability stands at an interesting precipice, as it does
not inspire the same values conflicts as many other social move-
ments and minority categories.85 Although varying by the type of
disability, research demonstrates that people experience disability
with pity, fear, and paternalism, but not necessarily animus.86
Editorial, The Lawyers Employment Act, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at A18 (arguing that the
law would “mostly benefit lawyers who will cash in on the litigation that will force judges to,
in effect, write the real law”). 
82. See Ruth Colker, Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 33, 33, 38-39 (2004); see also 135 CONG. REC. 22,734 (1989)
(statement of Rep. Burton) (“The ADA is the last ditch attempt of the remorseless sodomy
lobby to achieve its national agenda before the impending decimation of AIDS destroys its
political clout. Their Bill simply must be stopped. There will be no second chance for normal
America if the ADA is passed.”).
83. On the distinction, see Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 599, 602 n.21 (2000).
84. See id.; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 486-87 (1992); Edward L. Hudgins, Handicapping
Freedom: The Americans with Disabilities Act, REGULATION, Spring 1995, at 67, 67, 75-
76, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1995/4/v18n2-7.pdf [http://
perma.cc/ZGQ5-L8GC].
85. Lots of reasons can be, and have been, offered for this, including, but not limited to:
the possibility that the disability classification is the one minority group that anyone can join
at any time; the overlap of disability and age; and the “hidden army” of disability rights,
meaning that most people have some personal experience with disability themselves or with
family members or friends, which led to important supporters of disability rights on both
sides of the political aisle. See Selmi, supra note 14, at 538-39 (noting how members of
Congress with personal life experience with disability “would play critical roles in ensuring
the passage of the ADA, and perhaps because of the personal connections to issues of
disability, there was virtually no opposition to the ADA in either the House or the Senate”).
In this Article, I do not try to deconstruct this phenomenon; rather, I largely take it as a
given, examining its effects on the way the movement’s rights are constructed. 
86. See LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
13 (1991) (74 percent of Americans felt pity toward disabled individuals); see also ALAN
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The fact that both political parties can lay some measure of claim
to disability rights certainly can be viewed as a contributing factor
to the low political salience.87 To secure passage of the ADA, advo-
cates succeeded by staying away from the culture wars.88 Commen-
tators have suggested that the relatively easy route of disability
rights, as embodied in the ADA, reflects that the efforts to recognize
rights for people with disabilities were not perceived as threatening
the interests of the majority (particularly white males) in the same
way that parallel efforts to integrate women and minorities were.89
As explained by Sara Watson, “[t]he concept of providing civil rights
protections for people with disabilities had advanced far enough to
make itself palatable but not so far that it had become unpopular or
even objectionable.”90 This meant that despite the obvious political
power of the big tent version of the disability rights movement,
there was simply not the same values clashes as with earlier civil
rights struggles. 
As a cause, or perhaps effect, of the lack of a values clash, public
awareness of the law was low. Although the disability rights com-
munity certainly viewed the law as transformative and reflective of
a vision of a mandate to extend full citizenship in every form to peo-
ple with disabilities, most people did not see the law that way, to the
GARTNER & TOM JOE, IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 2-3 (1987) (demonstrat-
ing how the disabled are characterized as feeble or incapable, and are often objectified); NAT’L
INST. ON MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 6-8 (1999)
(noting that although for people with physical disabilities the most common form of
discrimination is paternalism, in the case of mental disability, discrimination is manifested
as bias, distrust, stereotyping, fear, embarrassment, anger, or avoidance); Chai R. Feldblum,
Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And
What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 165 (2000) (“[T]he public’s need
to define a person who uses a wheelchair as ‘disabled’ ... derives from the idea that disabled
people lack value and are to be pitied.”); Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences:
Disability and Discrimination, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 39, 43-44 (1988) (“Probably the most common
threat from disabled individuals is summed up in the concept of existential anxiety: the
perceived threat that a disability could interfere with functional capacities deemed necessary
to the pursuit of a satisfactory life.”).
87. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 1012-13 (2003); see also Schacter, supra note 6, at 1205-06 (arguing
that the salience of same-sex marriage was driven by the Republican Party aggressively
pressing the issue). 
88. See SWITZER, supra note 66, at 109.
89. See id. (“[T]he disability rights movement had not evolved to the point that disabled
people were considered a threat to the nondisabled majority.”). 
90. See Watson, supra note 76, at 28.
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extent they were aware of it all.91 A nationwide poll conducted in
1991 by Harris Associates demonstrated that only 18 percent of
those questioned were aware of the ADA’s existence.92 The history
of the passage of the ADA shows that this was at least in part an in-
tentional effort by disability rights advocates to operate a stealth
campaign to minimize political resistance. As one researcher ex-
plained, “[a]voiding the media and any attempt to try to explain the
legislation to the press became a key element of the fight for
passage of the ADA.”93 Notice the key difference with the passage of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “which had been graphically
presented by media around the world. Images of lynchings, police
dogs, and fire hoses became synonymous with the struggle for civil
rights; few parallel images characterized the needs of disabled
persons.”94
As a goal, the ADA was thus relatively easily realized.95 In other
civil rights movements, by the time advocates sought constitutional
recognition of the specific right they were claiming (either through
the courts or statutory law), there existed a state-level precedent to
which they could point. By the time Obergefell was decided, almost
half of the states had laws or court decisions that legalized same sex
marriage.96 When Roe was decided, four states had outright re-
pealed their abortion bans, and several others had reformed their
91. See SHAPIRO, supra note 66, at 141 (“[I]t was an odd victory; as radical as the ADA’s
passage would be for disabled people, nondisabled Americans still had little understanding
that this group now demanded rights, not pity.”). 
92. See LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., supra note 86, at 60; see also Krieger, supra note 21, at
491.
93. See SWITZER, supra note 66, at 107; see also Selmi, supra note 14, at 542 (“The
lobbying community also made an important strategic decision that may have further limited
the possibility of an expansive judicial approach to the statute. Early on, the lobbying
community decided not to mount a large publicity campaign for the ADA or to rally broad
public support but instead opted to work solely within Congress.”); Joseph P. Shapiro,
Disability Rights as Civil Rights: The Struggle for Recognition, in THE DISABLED, THE MEDIA,
AND THE INFORMATION AGE 59, 59 (Jack A. Nelson ed., 1994) (noting the statement of Patricia
Wright, lead lobbyist on the ADA, that “[w]e would have been forced to spend half our time
trying to teach reporters what’s wrong with their stereotypes of people with disabilities”).
94. See SWITZER, supra note 66, at 108.
95. In the Senate, there were four hearings on the ADA, and the bill passed within five
months by a 76-8 vote. 135 CONG. REC. 19,903 (1989). In the House, there were more hearings,
but the bill still went for a vote within nine months and ultimately passed by a vote of 403-20.
136 CONG. REC. 11,466 (1990).
96. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, App. B (2015).
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laws.97 Before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, twenty-five
states prohibited discrimination on the basis of race in employ-
ment,98 and thirty, in privately owned places of public accommoda-
tion.99 The specific judicial or federal statutory intervention sought
was thus one point on the continuum of contestation. The ADA was
not drawn on a completely blank slate—most states did have some
form of antidiscrimination laws. But by combining a broad defini-
tion of disability (including physical and mental impairments), a
reasonable accommodation provision in private employment, acces-
sibility and accommodation requirements for privately owned places
of public accommodation, and a private right of enforcement for the
employment and public accommodations provisions and damages
remedy for employment, the ADA went significantly further than
almost any state.100 
A lack of public awareness and participation has continued.101
Unlike other claims by identity-based social movements, disability
is rarely (if ever) an issue in political campaigns or judicial confir-
mations. On lists of important issues in presidential campaigns,
abortion, gay marriage, and criminal justice appear as contested
social issues; disability does not.102 Both at the ADA passage stage
97. See Sarah Kliff, Thirteen Charts That Explain How Roe v. Wade Changed Abortion
Rights, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/
01/22/thirteen-charts-that-explain-how-roe-v-wade-changed-abortion-rights/ [http://perma.cc/
U7XA-FQ4Z]. 
98. See 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
99. See 110 CONG. REC. 6537-39 (1964) (statement of Sen. Magnuson and Sen. Hruska).
100. See H.R. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990,
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 47-48 (1990) (“State laws are inadequate to address the
pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are facing .... [T]he fifty
State Governor’s Committees ... report that existing state laws do not adequately counter acts
of discrimination against people with disabilities.”); see also Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The
Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA.
L. REV. 1075, 1075-76 (2002); Don F. Nicolai & William J. Ricci, Access to Buildings and Equal
Employment Opportunity for the Disabled: Survey of State Statutes, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 1067, 1085
(1977) (describing the shortcomings of state public accommodation provisions); Christine Jolls
& J.J. Prescott, Disaggregating Employment Protection: The Case of Disability Discrimination
2-4, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10,740, 2004), http://www.
nber.org/papers/w10740.pdf [http://perma.cc/L5V5-AZL7].
101. See SWITZER, supra note 66, at 92 (noting “a ‘hidden army for civil rights’ that
coalesced sufficiently to capture political interest just long enough” to get the law passed). 
102. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye et al., Election 2008: Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES, http://
elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/abortion.html [http://perma.cc/NG2Z-APZZ] (last
visited Oct. 23, 2015).
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and following its enactment, there was simply no comparable ex-
press, organized, and mobilized resistance to the disability rights
movement.103 The Chamber of Commerce, who would be the most
natural entity in opposition (due to the costs, both real and per-
ceived, that the ADA would impose on its members), certainly had
lobbyists who expressed concerns about the bill.104 But early on, the
business community made the decision to work for a bill they could
live with, rather than oppose it entirely.105 The extent to which they
were willing to cooperate with disability advocates is revealed in the
passage of the ADAAA. At the request of key legislators, representa-
tives for the business community—made up of the Chamber of
Commerce, the HR Policy Association, the Society of Human
Resource Management, and the National Association of Manufac-
turers—met in 2008 with representatives from the disability com-
munity in a series of negotiations over thirteen weeks to come up
with a compromise agreement, which formed the complete basis for
the ADAAA.106 
Litigation under the ADA has also not been an occasion for
expression of values struggles between common adversaries, as it
has been with other movements. Unlike judicial proceedings with
abortion, gay marriage, or even gun rights, in which familiar oppon-
ents repeatedly mobilized and squared off against each other, the
disability cases that have gone to the Supreme Court (of which there
are a significant number) have almost uniformly not been brought
or directed in significant extent by lawyers with formal connections
to the disability rights movement,107 and the defendants are state or
local governments or private businesses, who have not been repeat
103. See Waterstone, supra note 3, at 554.
104. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L.
& C.R. 187, 229-30 n.166 (2008).
105. See Paula Yost, Business Not Fighting Bill for Disabled, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1989,
at A12 (explaining that business lobbyists decided to work towards a more palatable bill rath-
er than oppose it outright).
106. See Feldblum et al., supra note 104, at 229-30. With both groups signing off, the law
passed in the House of Representatives with a vote of 402-17 and unanimously in the Senate,
and was signed into law in September of 2008. Id.
107. See Stein et al., supra note 67, at 1661-62 (“Over the first two decades of the ADA, the
Supreme Court heard eighteen related cases. None of the lawyers who filed these actions that
have been litigated in the Supreme Court [were disability cause lawyers]. Instead, these cases
generally have been initiated by lawyers with limited civil rights experience, let alone exper-
ience with, and connection to, the broader disability rights movement.”).
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players. The amicus participation reflects this general lack of
movement-countermovement dynamic and public engagement.108
Cases interpreting the ADA’s definition of disability dominated
litigation in the first two decades after the law’s passage. Both lower
courts and the Supreme Court generally interpreted the definition
narrowly, limiting the universe of people who were considered
covered under this threshold inquiry.109 These interpretations led to
the idea of a judicial backlash against the ADA.110 Commentators
have generally expressed incredulity that judges interpreted the law
so narrowly—particularly, in employment cases—and with objec-
tionable outcomes that seemed inconsistent with the law’s text.111
One diagnosis observed that an increasingly conservative judiciary
simply did not like the ADA.112 From a tactical perspective, several
of the first round of cases to go to the Supreme Court had less than
desirable fact patterns.113 They were also brought by individuals
with disabilities that could be considered more marginal and further
removed from any history of discrimination.114 With this in mind,
judicial resistance in disability cases is different than the charged,
broad-based countermovement structure exhibited in other areas.
Rather, it can be understood as the judiciary—tracking public
understanding115—resisting the idea that a large and amorphous
108. For example, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), one of the first
ADA cases to make it to the Supreme Court, there were eleven amicus briefs filed with the
Court.
109. See Stein et al., supra note 67, at 1659.
110. See id.
111. See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial
Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 55 (2000)
(linking the narrow interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability to a textualist method-
ology of statutory interpretation); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., “Substantially Limited”
Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions
of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 439 (1997); Diller, supra note 62, at 24
(outlining “a few areas in which substantial numbers of courts have relied on restrictive inter-
pretations of the ADA that unnecessarily and unfairly work to the detriment of plaintiffs”).
112. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 160 (1999) (“[C]onservative judges may simply be hostile to the
ADA.”). 
113. The early Supreme Court cases involved sisters with myopia attempting to be airline
pilots, see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76, and someone with a visual impairment trying to secure
certification as a truck driver, see Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 558-60
(1999).
114. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 67, at 41.
115. See, e.g., Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung, and Juggler’s Despair:
2015] THE COSTS OF EASY VICTORY 615
category of people might be entitled to some form of statutory rights
about which there had been limited public dialogue. 
In sum, in contrast with accounts of other movements that dem-
onstrate the interaction of social movements and law across branch-
es and levels of conflict, disability looks rather one-dimensional. A
big tent model of disability helped to get the ADA passed, and when
judges did not interpret the law in the way the community hoped,
there was a move back to Congress. The fight for disability rights
lacked a broad-based social movement working in harmony with the
large category of people with disabilities covered by the statute.116
And, in response, no mobilized opposition materialized, beyond
judicial and public trepidation about the limits of how many people
the ADA might actually cover.
II. LIMITED CONFLICT AND CATEGORY AMBIGUITY AS A NEW FRAME
FOR UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW
The above discussion has demonstrated that several identity-
based groups—some of whom the disability rights movement pat-
terned themselves after—have faced more charged conflict in their
claims for rights than the disability rights movement. Resistance to
the disability rights project has been less value-driven, has not
featured parallel public debate or political contestation, and has not
encountered a similar organized countermovement structure. The
ambiguity over the large category of people potentially covered by
the ADA dominated public and judicial conversation about the law.
This Part offers the limited conflict and category ambiguity frames
as a new way to understand the limited ability of the disability
rights movement to make progress on some of its harder and more
transformative goals.
With the ADA, the newly constituted and broadly defined dis-
ability rights movement flexed its political power. Buoyed by their
ability to get omnibus civil rights legislation passed when others
The Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 223-34 (2000); see also Krieger, supra note 62, at 10-11 (describing The
Simpsons and King of the Hill episodes portraying, in humorous ways, characters attempting
to take advantage of disability laws). 
116. See Stein, supra note 13, at 626-27.
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had failed,117 one of the most important and specific goals of the
ADA was to open up workplaces and increase the employment rate
of people with disabilities.118 Despite other areas of progress, it is
clear that this goal has not been realized. ADA Title I cases have the
lowest success rate of any private litigant group other than prison-
ers.119 Although they offer different explanations, commentators and
policymakers are in agreement that the ADA has not increased the
employment levels of people with disabilities.120 
Operating at a higher level of generality, another goal of the ADA
was to turn disability into a civil rights issue.121 This was not just a
semantic distinction. Pre-ADA American disability policy, and
117. See Krieger, supra note 62, at 2 (noting that President Bush vetoed a raise in the
minimum wage and the Family Medical Leave Act contemporaneously with signing the ADA). 
118. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SHARING THE DREAM: IS THE ADA ACCOMMODAT-
ING ALL? 19-38 (2000), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED457626.pdf [http://perma.cc/CSF4-
3M42] (“In passing the ADA, Congress intended to eliminate discrimination in the workplace
and create more employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities.”); see also 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2012) (“[T]he continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrim-
ination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal
basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and
costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency
and nonproductivity.”).
119. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Mental & Physical Disability, Study Finds Em-
ployers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYS-
ICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998) (demonstrating that plaintiffs lost 92 percent of the
time in published ADA Title I cases that had gone to judgment or trial between 1992 and
1997); see also Colker, supra note 112, at 107 (noting that, of cases appealed to the courts of
appeals, plaintiffs lost 94 percent of the time in the trial court).
120. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, FULFILLING THE PROMISE:
OVERCOMING PERSISTENT BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY FOR PEOPLE WITH DIS-
ABILITIES 3 (2014), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HELP%20Committee%20
Disability%20and%20Poverty%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/54JZ-DVKV] (“Of the over 20
million Americans with disabilities who are of working age, less than 30 percent work,
compared to over 78 percent of non-disabled Americans.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future
of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 19-20 (2004); Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The
Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the
Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 271-74 (2000) (noting that, although employ-
ment rates have not gone up, and may have gone down since the ADA was passed, those
trends are not necessarily attributable to the ADA).
121. See supra note 71; see also S. COMM. ON LABOR & HUMAN RES., AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1989, S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 118 (1989) (noting testimony of Tony Coelho
that “[w]hile the charity model once represented a step forward in the treatment of persons
with handicaps, in today’s society it is irrelevant ... [o]ur model must change”); 136 CONG.
REC. 17,289 (1990) (statement of Rep. Owens) (“The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
will at long last provide parallel civil rights protections to our citizens with disabilities as are
afforded other minority groups in our society.”).
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popular conceptions of disability, were based on a “medical model”
of disability, in which disability was an empirically diagnosable
condition attributable to some biological or physiological difference
from the norm.122 Shifting toward rights, away from paternalism
and charity, marked a move toward the “social model” of disability,
which envisions disability as a construct that is the interaction of a
person’s impairment and societal responses to that impairment.123
The actual impairment someone has becomes less legally important;
instead, the framework shifts to environmental choices that accom-
modate the largest possible universe of abilities.124 The disability
rights movement believed that it would not only be transformative
for the rights of people with disabilities to enter the citizenry on
equal terms, but that it would also represent a paradigm shift
within equality law generally. Advocates hoped the ADA could
tackle deep-seated social problems that had thus far proved
unreachable by moving past formal equality (equality based on
treatment of similarly situated individuals) and encompassing a
structural theory of equality (also referred to as a “second-genera-
tion” civil rights statute),125 which acknowledged difference and the
need for reasonable accommodation.126 The general civil rights
community shared in these hopes,127 and academics bought in to the
goal.128
122. See, e.g., PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY 3 (3d ed.
2014).
123. Id. at 5-7.
124. This was explicitly recognized in the ADA through the “regarded as” prong of the
definition of disability, in which someone is considered to have a disability under the statute
if someone regards them as having one, regardless of whether they actually do or not. See 42
U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2012).
125. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Impli-
cations of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 414-15
(1991).
126. See Krieger, supra note 62, at 6 (“The ADA promised to revive the concept of stigma
as a powerful hermeneutic for the elaboration and judicial application of American civil rights
law. Supporters and detractors alike predicted that the structural approach to equality
advanced by the ADA might eventually diffuse into other areas of law, eroding the entrenched
understanding that equality always—and only—requires equal treatment under rules and
practices assumed to be neutral.”).
127. Id. at 3 (“[T]here was ... hope ... that the ADA would transform the lives of disabled
Americans, but also that the theoretical breakthrough represented by reasonable accommo-
dation theory would eventually play a role in solving other equality problems.”). 
128. See Paul Steven Miller, Disability Civil Rights and a New Paradigm for the Twenty-
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Measuring the success of this goal is harder than the employment
rate. Certainly the ADA has made some significant progress in
making federal disability policy a tool to restructure environments
and programs in a way that is more inclusive toward disability.
Title III of the ADA, for example, concretely requires certain stan-
dards in new or renovated buildings.129 But ADA cases, at both the
lower and Supreme Court levels, still generally reflect the older,
medical way of thinking about disability that the ADA hoped to
replace.130 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, which held that the
ADA allowed an employer to protect an oil refinery worker from
harm to himself—despite medical evidence from his doctor that any
harm was limited, and despite the plaintiff ’s desire to stay in the job
and face whatever risks there were131—the Court evinced traditional
paternalistic views toward the disability category.132 Similarly,
Justice Kennedy opined in a concurrence in Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett that disability prejudice is natural
First Century: The Expansion of Civil Rights Beyond Race, Gender, and Age, 1 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 511, 526 (1998) (“The disability civil rights paradigm can provide the model for an
individualized, flexible and contextual approach to civil rights enforcement.”); see also Pamela
S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation,
46 DUKE L.J. 1, 38 (1996) (“The insights gained from fleshing out the meaning of reasonable
accommodation in disability cases present an opportunity to rethink employment discrim-
ination law more generally.”). 
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(a)(iv); see also S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR &
PENSIONS, supra note 120, at 2 (“The ADA’s enactment radically changed the landscape of the
country and enfranchised persons with disabilities in ways that were previously unimag-
inable. Those with disabilities can now move about towns and cities because of curb cuts.
They can cross at intersections because of traffic lights that talk and tell a person when it is
safe to cross the street.... These and thousands of other changes make it possible for those
with disabilities to be active participants in their communities and to take part in society as
equals.”).
130. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 62, at 24-25 (examining ADA case law and arguing that
courts were not using civil rights constructions in evaluating whether or not plaintiffs met the
ADA’s definition of disability); see also Burgdorf Jr., supra note 111, at 482-47 (same).
131. 536 U.S. 73, 85-87 (2002).
132. Anita Silvers et al., Disability and Employment Discrimination at the Rehnquist
Court, 75 MISS. L.J. 945, 970-71 (2006) (demonstrating the Supreme Court’s paternalist view
of disability in Chevron). The one Supreme Court case that grappled with deeper issues of
disability equality was Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999), holding that insti-
tutionalized placements in certain circumstances violated the ADA’s integration mandate. In
future work, I hope to explore how Olmstead’s exceptionalism was at least in part a result of
a long-running and multidimensional deinstitutionalization movement on behalf of a relative-
ly well-defined and understandably discriminated-against population. See infra notes 199-203.
2015] THE COSTS OF EASY VICTORY 619
unless we are guided by the “better angels of our nature.”133 Rather
than focusing on what it means to accommodate and notions of
equality, ADA cases focused on who falls inside the definition of
disability, a form of legal reasoning itself reflecting a check-the-
box, medical approach to thinking about disability.134 Despite the
goal to have disability be identified as a civil rights issue, it rou-
tinely is not.135
Improving employment levels and changing conventional think-
ing about disability are admittedly hard pursuits. Yet they were
among the ambitions present at the ADA’s founding, and various
explanations have been offered for the limits of the ADA in both of
these areas. Regarding the employment rate, there is economic-
based literature about whether the ADA creates helpful incentives
for employers to hire employees with disabilities.136 Others have
noted the limits of an antidiscrimination approach generally,137 or,
133. 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. See Michael E. Waterstone et al., Disability Cause Lawyers, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1287, 1318 n.151 (2012) (noting views of disability constitutional lawyers: “I don’t see how you
can do constitutional litigation in the disability area until you have judges whose percep-
tion[s] of disability move[ ] away from the sympathy narrative to the rights narrative” and
“people don’t think about disability rights on the same level as racial discrimination or race-
based civil rights”). Most earlier social programs for people with disabilities were and remain
expressly based on medical determinations of inability to work, a mindset that has worked
its way into ADA cases. See Diller, supra note 62, at 31 (“Although many courts have
recognized the distinction between the ADA’s definition of disability and that contained in the
Social Security Act, they have often failed to grasp its full implications. After acknowledging
the differences in the statutes, they have nonetheless treated general statements of inability
to work on benefits applications as dispositive of ADA claims.”).
135. For a discussion of disability not being thought of by academics, policymakers, and the
public as a civil rights issue, see Doris Zames Fleischer, Disability Rights: The Overlooked
Civil Rights Issue, 25 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 8 (2005). See generally ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL,
THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES (1996). 
136. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 240-42 (2000);
see also Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The
Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 916 (2001); Peter Blanck
et al., Calibrating the Impact of the ADA’s Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
267, 274 (2003); Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM.
ECON. REV. 177, 180 (1989) (discussing the costs of mandated benefits to the wages and hiring
of people with disabilities).
137. See generally Bagenstos, supra note 120; see also Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accom-
modation and the Labor Market, in DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND
OPPORTUNITIES 18, 28-30 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991) (arguing for government spending on
education and work training, instead of accommodations); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the
Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for People with Disabilities,
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as discussed above, have been critical of a perceived conservative
judiciary.138 Regarding the lack of a fundamental shift in attitudes,
scholars note the stickiness of prevailing thinking about disabil-
ity.139 
Without necessarily disputing these existing narratives, I want
to offer a different understanding. When reviewed in reference to
other movements discussed above, the level of conflict and contro-
versy around the ADA as a key tool to accomplish these goals was
relatively low. The disability rights community (and some academ-
ics) had a vision of the statute as having transformative potential in
these areas.140 But no one else did, leaving, I suggest, the public and
judiciary unprepared to think about the law in these terms.141 As
discussed above, the unification of various disability-specific groups
achieved maximum political power but required a broad definition
operating at a high level of generality.142 The literature on constitu-
tional claiming offers examples suggesting that group composition
is important to the type of conflict that rights claiming generates.143
For disability, the answer was a large, socially-constructed, amor-
phous group, which shifted the conversation away from groups that
might have had more traction in popular discourse and into areas
46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 124 (1998) (“Existing legal remedies embodied in the Americans with
Disabilities Act and other laws, though beneficial, do not eliminate the problem [of
discrimination against those with disabilities].”).
138. See supra notes 111-12.
139. One prominent scholar suggests that narrow judicial interpretations were a result of
judicial confusion between notions of impairment and disability, judicial refusal to adopt a
socio-political conception of disability, and rejecting the analogy between disability and the
minority model and civil rights. See Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreason-
able Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 166-67 (2000).
140. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
141. See SHAPIRO, supra note 66, at 140-41; see also supra notes 92-94 and accompanying
text.
142. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
143. The literature that discusses Heller and a Second Amendment private right to bear
arms sheds light on the importance of group composition in forming claims. In the wake of
the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, there was a conscious effort by the NRA’s
leadership to distance itself from the militia and paramilitary movement, which until then
it had loosely courted. See Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra note 5, at 229-31. When the Heller
Court considered the Second Amendment, it was guided by the NRA’s “family-friendly public
image,” to the exclusion of paramilitary activity. Id. at 231.
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that were not intuitively compatible with the social model concep-
tion of equality disability under which advocates sought to unite.144 
The law needed the support of the public and judges to be imple-
mented and enforced.145 Even if there were shared understandings
of what the law meant (which there were not), the ADA could not
stand on its own to create these changes.146 In our system of private
rights enforcement, individuals would need to engage courts to help
protect their statutory rights, either because businesses ignored
statutory requirements or because there was disagreement as to
what the statute required.147 Rather than providing exact guidance,
the ADA left several core concepts, apart from the definition of
disability, undefined—including the notion of reasonable accommo-
dation, undue burden and hardship, and direct threat, just to name
a few—either furnishing illustrative examples that required future
elaboration by administrative agencies, or otherwise punting to the
courts to help provide meaning.148
Regarding employment, it is undoubtedly correct that the ADA
stood very little chance of success in moving the employment rate on
its own.149 But it is also true that a robust interpretation of the
ADA, and in particular its reasonable accommodation provision re-
quiring employers to make accommodations that were not an undue
hardship at their own expense, needs to work in tandem with other
policy measures to meet any disability-related employment goals.150
One great hope for the ADA was that it could actively work to re-
structure workplaces, challenging assumptions about what was
truly necessary and suggesting that a broader range of individuals
could flourish in employment settings.151 But by and large, this has
144. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 166-79 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 166-79 and accompanying text.
148. See Krieger, supra note 21, at 520 (“The ADA is an extremely complex statute, in-
corporating many vague standards requiring the case-by-case balancing of under-specified
factors.”).
149. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. 
150. See Bagenstos, supra note 120, at 23. In public speeches, EEOC Commissioner (and
ADA architect) Chai Feldblum says this best, remarking that “the ADA is a necessary but not
sufficient condition.” Chai Feldblum, Comm’r, EEOC, Remarks at the Business Meeting and
Closing Plenary Session of the Association of University Centers on Disabilities (Nov. 20,
2013) (transcript available at http://perma.cc/A3FQ-9UE2).
151. See supra note 128.
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not happened.152 Even setting aside the vast majority of ADA em-
ployment cases that are decided against plaintiffs at the summary
judgment stage, the existing cases take a cramped view of what the
law requires regarding reasonable accommodation and workplace
restructuring.153 For example, in today’s evolving workplace, it is
more common for many workers to face issues with commuting and
virtual workplaces.154 Rather than the ADA creating space for these
types of modifications generally, judges regularly deny them as
requests for reasonable accommodation.155 Although not as uniform,
there are similar results involving requests for reassignment.156
152. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 20-24 (2000) (discussing traditional families and working roles);
Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283,
364-67 (2003); Michelle A. Travis, Telecommuting: The Escher Stairway of Work/Family
Conflict, 55 ME. L. REV. 261, 282-86 (2002).
155. See, e.g., Regan v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc., 679 F.3d 475, 480 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We
find ... that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not require Faurecia to accommodate
Regan’s request for a commute during more convenient hours.”); Robinson v. Bodman, 333 F.
App’x 205, 208 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The [employer] was not required to accommodate [the
plaintiff’s] inability to drive to work or use public transportation. Although an employer is
required to make reasonable accommodations to eliminate barriers for a disabled employee
in the workplace, the employer is not required to eliminate barriers outside the workplace
that make it more difficult for the employee to get to and from work.”); Kvorjak v. Maine, 259
F.3d 48, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2001) (denial of request to work from home); LaResca v. AT&T, 161
F. Supp. 2d 323, 333 (D.N.J. 2001) (“[T]he change to day shift sought by Plaintiff is not an
‘accommodation,’ that it is legally obligated to provide, but is simply a request for an easier,
more convenient commute.”); Salmon v. Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1163 (S.D.
Fla. 1998) (rejecting plaintiff ’s claims that the employer “failed to accommodate her disability
by transferring her to a school which afforded her a shorter commute .... [because] plaintiff ’s
commute to and from work is an activity that is unrelated to and outside of her job”);
Schneider v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 95 C 1820, 1996 WL 944721, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1996)
(finding that an employer is not required to eliminate an employee’s commute to accommo-
date the employee’s back injury); Chandler v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 850 F. Supp. 728, 738
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (employee’s inability to undertake a long commute because of back injury was
not a disability for purposes of the employer’s benefit plan but instead a limitation within the
employee’s control).
156. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393-94 (2002) (holding that
seniority system prevails over reassignment request in run of cases); Huber v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 481 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding a policy to hire the most qualified
candidate); EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing the
reassignment provision and finding that the Americans with Disabilities Act is not an
affirmative action statute), overruled by EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.
2012). But see Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring re-
assignment as a reasonable accommodation). 
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Even when employers make accommodations that conceivably go
beyond the bare minimum of what the law requires, courts have
been reluctant to allow plaintiffs to keep those accommodations
when a new supervisor comes in and looks to take them away.157
More significant interventions that stretch even further beyond the
bounds of the traditional workplace, like having employers provide
assistance for home healthcare workers or modify insurance provi-
sions to benefit people with disabilities, have consistently been off
the table—even if their expense would not have been great.158 The
ADA has simply not yet served a significant role in creating a re-
envisioned workplace, one that is more accessible to individuals
with or without disabilities.159 
The different conflict and category frameworks make these re-
sults unsurprising. Given low public engagement and awareness of
the law at the time of its passage, there was no mandate for this
more radical intrusion into the workplace.160 Nor could advocates
point to state laws being interpreted or implemented in this way.161
In the absence of being forcibly directed by the disability rights
movement and even the public, judges would not arrive at such a
conclusion on their own.162 Although the ADA’s legislative record
157. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995) (“And
if the employer, because it is a government agency and therefore is not under intense com-
petitive pressure to minimize its labor costs or maximize the value of its output, or for some
other reason, bends over backwards to accommodate a disabled worker—goes further than
the law requires—by allowing the worker to work at home, it must not be punished for its
generosity by being deemed to have conceded the reasonableness of so far-reaching an
accommodation.”). But see Isbell v. John Crane, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 725, 734-35 (N.D. Ill.
2014).
158. See Bagenstos, supra note 120, at 34-54 (arguing that this has been an expected,
though logically indeterminate, interpretation of the ADA). 
159. See Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 5-6 (2005).
160. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
161. See Balkin, supra note 16, at 563-64 (noting that when the Court decided Brown, most
states had already ended de jure racial segregation in public schools, and Lawrence was
decided only after a vast majority of states had decriminalized sodomy).
162. The business community predictably did not embrace a move away from structural
equality, viewing it as more akin to unpopular affirmative action, and in any event, an
unwelcome move away from concepts of employment at will and limited employer respon-
sibility to provide living wages or health insurance. See Russell, supra note 63, at 335-36
(characterizing resistance to ADA and other employment discrimination laws as being an
outgrowth of the lack of a living wage and access to healthcare); see also Diller, supra note
62, at 46-47 (examining skepticism of the ADA, noting that “the ADA impinges on the long-
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reflects concerns by the business community about the cost of
accommodations in the workplace, the more ambitious and costly
project of breaking down power structures in workplaces was not
made a part of a contested political process.163 To be fair, transform-
ing the workplace has been and remains an unrealized aspiration
of progressive forces in employment law generally.164 But just as
scholars have posited that constitutional claims do not succeed
without the work of social movements and political parties “making
claims, taking positions, and trying to persuade others,”165 the same
theory applies to statues. The ADA is unlikely to lead the way on
this type of transformative change; rather, it will await a day and
coalition with a higher level of public buy-in. 
In terms of positioning disability as a civil rights issue, here too,
for all of its benefits, the ADA had unappreciated limitations. There
are very few express positions taken denying the rights of people
with disabilities to “live in the world.”166 Rather, there seems to be
superficial agreement that people with disabilities are deserving of
equal rights, although there is widespread misunderstanding and
apathy as to what that might mean.167 This veneer of agreement
masking a lack of meaningful debate and discussion has stilted pro-
gress.168 Therefore, as Harlan Hahn suggests, it is not surprising
that judicial outcomes reflect common notions of paternalism and
pity, not the transformative civil rights potential that disability
held doctrine of at-will employment, under which employers are free to make arbitrary,
absurd or seemingly ridiculous demands on their employees”).
163. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 109 (1989) (noting that several witnesses explained how
Title I is based on “regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,” and compliance
is “no big deal”); id (noting testimony of Harold Russell, chairperson of the President’s Com-
mittee on Employment of People with Disabilities, that for a majority of employees, no
accommodation is required; for others, the costs can be less than $50; even for more expensive
accommodations, costs are “frequently exaggerated”).
164. See supra note 118.
165. See Balkin, supra note 16, at 593-94. 
166. See Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of
Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841, 848 (1966).
167. See Hahn, supra note 139, at 166 (“Only a few have expressed open criticism or
opposition to the principle of equal rights for Americans with disabilities. Nonetheless, many
activists in the disability rights movement may react with a knowing glance, a meaningful
smile, a slight shake of the head, and a muttered aside: ‘They just don’t get it, do they?’”).
168. Id. at 167 (“The superficial discussion of issues that appear to evoke agreement, but
are actually the source of deep-seated conflict, has masked an accurate appreciation of public,
judicial, and other reactions to the ADA.”).
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rights advocates view as so ingrained in the fabric of the ADA.169 In
explaining Supreme Court disability cases, Professor Sam
Bagenstos has argued that, contrary to those who assert the cases
have no basis in fact or reason, they are explainable through
divergent strands in the disability community itself.170 My point is
similar, but also different: judges were not put in a position where
they could be guided by public and political debates, as disability
rights advocates would have hoped, because these debates were not
happening.171 
To the extent there was any public discussion of the ADA, it did
not include vetting the hard and contentious choices that would
need to be made to impact employment, or a transformative vision
of equality.172 The claims that initially developed through the courts
did not necessarily lend themselves to the law’s transformative
potential in the employment context or in promoting the evolution
of disability theory.173 The Supreme Court too easily viewed cases
like Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. (sisters with myopia seeking ac-
commodation to be airline pilots)174 and Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg (truck driver with visual impairment seeking certifi-
cation)175 in a different way from how the disability rights movement
viewed them, or even from how other civil rights claims were
perceived.176 Other groups could make the claim that they just
wanted to be treated “equally” under law, and that state laws ex-
pressly, needlessly, and as a result of historical prejudice, stood in
the way of this equality. There are disability claims—many within
169. Id. at 172 (“[T]he characteristics of the plaintiffs [in ADA cases] may have been a less
important determinant of the litigation than the social, political, and legal values of non-
disabled employers, attorneys, and judges who have scant personal awareness or education
concerning the prejudice and discrimination encountered by disabled Americans.”).
170. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 67, at 34-55.
171. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
173. This was certainly compounded by the lack of participation of disability cause lawyers
in ADA cases that made it to the Supreme Court. For an extensive account of this phe-
nomenon, and the extent to which—in contrast to other groups—the narrative of ADA
Supreme Court cases was dominated by lawyers without connections to the disability rights
movement, see Stein et al., supra note 67, at 1658-64.
174. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
175. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
176. See Stein, supra note 13, at 606. 
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the ADA’s broad coverage—that fit this mold,177 but in terms of
public and judicial conceptions of the ADA’s meaning, these claims
were quickly drowned out by perceived claims for special rights and
preferential treatment, oftentimes by people with disabilities that
were considered marginal or easily mitigated.178 The disability
experience teaches that the type of constitutional claiming and the
construction of the group bringing the claim matters in the constant
dialogue between social movements, the public, and judges.179 
Relatedly, given the omnibus nature of the ADA, there was also
ambiguity as to which rights were being claimed.180 In some other
movements, although they changed over time and shifted levels of
government, the stakes of rights claiming and conflict were clear-
er.181 Should gays and lesbians be allowed to marry consistent with
opposite sex couples? Does the Second Amendment provide an in-
dividual right to bear arms? Under what circumstances does the
Equal Protection Clause require that state classifications and em-
ployers treat men and women equally? Can privately owned places
of public accommodation create separate facilities for people of
different races? In contrast, are claims for disability equality about
an individual with back pain who wants to maneuver around an
established seniority system to transfer to a different part of a
company,182 or are they about the ability of someone who uses a
wheelchair to access their court hearing?183 Although both may be
important from the perspective of disability advocates, the former
has dominated the ADA narrative.184 This focus has obscured the
disability rights movement’s core vision of equality drawn from the
social model of disability—that choices about the physical and
177. See Waterstone, supra note 3, at 548-55 (discussing areas within family law, voting,
and benefits where state laws expressly differentiate based on disability classifications).
178. See Krieger, supra note 21, at 520 (“[T]he ADA is an extremely complex statute,
incorporating many vague standards requiring the case-by-case balancing of under-specified
factors. This complexity and under-specification, I suggest, has created a legal field charac-
terized by intense normative ambiguity, which has in turn engendered hostility directed at
the Act, its enforcers, and its beneficiaries.”).
179. Id. at 519 (noting the importance of clarity in claiming a category, and offering the
ambiguities in the ADA as a partial explanation for backlash against it).
180. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
182. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394-95 (2002).
183. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S 509, 513-14 (2004)
184. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
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attitudinal environment are themselves not inevitable and contrib-
ute to what it means to experience disability.185 
Although the disability rights movement used the social move-
ment framework to unify diverse constituencies, the relatively easy
passage of the ADA meant that the broadly defined group did not
seek the support of social and political actors outside their core
community.186 Other groups, more squarely tested with conflict,
went outside their base, and commentators have explained how this
broadened network served a productive function in court battles.187
Whereas Roe “provoked opponents to enter the political arena” and
“inspired a political campaign to prohibit abortion that changed the
shape of both constitutional politics and constitutional law,”188 and
Bowers energized and transformed the direction of the gay rights
movement,189 the Supreme Court ADA cases have not provoked any
similar broad-based political or constitutional movements. 
And the recent playbook looks familiar to the past one. The
ADAAA was a return trip to Congress to legislatively “fix” how
courts had narrowed the definition of disability. Congress also
removed a finding in the original ADA that “individuals with disa-
bilities are ... a discrete and insular minority,” a move that is best
seen as reflecting that this language was a poor fit with the
ADAAA’s goals of broadening the definition of disability.190 The
ADAAA then doubled down on the political strategy of providing
civil rights protections for the largest possible population of people
with disabilities. It does, in a sense, force judges to move past the
issue of whether someone is disabled, and instead focus on whether
entities complied with their substantive obligations. Initial research
demonstrates that judges are indeed deciding fewer cases against
185. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
187. See Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 390 (“Citizens who oppose court decisions are
politically active. They enact their commitment to the importance of constitutional meaning.
They seek to persuade other [movements] ... to embrace their constitutional un-
derstandings.”). 
188. Id. at 398.
189. See NeJaime, supra note 5, at 985.
190. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 107-08 (2004), http://www.ncd.
gov/publications/2004/Dec12004 [http://perma.cc/R4GW-RCDG] (“The ‘discrete and insular
minority’ language was not intended to be applied to the full scope of persons to whom the
ADA provides protection from discrimination.”).
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plaintiffs on summary judgment at the definition of disability
stage.191 But if the lack of conflict over the ADA’s underlying equal-
ity principles and the broad and uncertain statutory coverage have
in some way contributed to the statute’s limits, then the ADAAA
may prove to be a hollow victory, and indeed perhaps even counter-
productive. Although there may be a small universe of easy cases,
in others, unconvinced as to why this (now larger) universe of people
are entitled to an employer-funded accommodation (itself not pre-
cisely defined), there may well be space for continued narrow inter-
pretations that leave plaintiffs on the losing end. This view cuts
against the prevailing scholarly trend to celebrate the ADAAA and
express hope that it will usher in a new era of ADA effectiveness.192
Indeed, locking in an expanded definition of disability may exacer-
bate the difficulty of having the discussion that disability rights
advocates hope to have about altering notions of equality. 
If accurate, this account challenges the thrust of a significant
body of disability law scholarship. Assuming the next twenty-five
years are remotely similar to the last twenty-five, disability rights
may remain something that incites passion only in a small group of
people. The nation has the “conviction that an essential mission of
the federal government is the prevention of racial and gender dis-
crimination.”193 Even with the work of dedicated lawyers seeking to
enforce it at every turn, it is unlikely that the ADA will magically
reach this status and move beyond its current low political sa-
lience.194 The disability law scholarship contains many accounts of
how judges should interpret the ADA differently195 or how new
191. See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Analysis of Case Outcomes Under the ADA
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2057-58 (2013).
192. Id. at 2070; see also Feldblum et al., supra note 104, at 240 (“And now we can get
down to the business of truly opening the doors of opportunity to all people with disabilities.”);
Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 229 (2008).
193. See Post, supra note 8, at 23.
194. Id. (characterizing the ADA as a statute of “relatively low political salience”); see also
Sarah Blahovec, Politicians Ignore Disability, and It’s a Big Problem, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 13, 2015, 6:59 PM), http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/7784824 [http://perma.cc/N2LS-
9SHX] (“Disability, yet again, is not recognized as a significant demographic in the political
sphere.”).
195. See, e.g., MARK WEBER, DISABILITY HARASSMENT (2007) (arguing that the ADA should
be interpreted to allow claims for disability harassment); Diller, supra note 62, at 51 (criti-
cizing ADA definition of disability decisions); Tucker, supra note 71, at 362 (same).
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theoretical insights would make a difference.196 My own work has
often fit into this mold.197 Though relevant and useful, this litera-
ture usually has an unstated premise that the civil rights frame-
work is correct—that there will come a day that disability rights
advocates hope for when people (and judges) somehow “get” disabil-
ity rights in this way. At least under the ADA-covered definition of
disability, this may be unrealistic. The more appropriate movement
analogy, and area for future study, might involve a group like veter-
ans, who have some measure of political power and still struggle for
societal acceptance and commitment to meet their needs.
Certainly, there is no magic “conflict” button upon which, if
advocates only remembered to flip the switch, transformation would
have occurred. Other groups in more contested space still struggle
in multiple places to change ingrained, structural, societal inequali-
ties.198 Advocates use what tools they have, and political power with
low political salience presents many opportunities. But the above
discussion has demonstrated that eluding values conflicts and maxi-
mizing statutory coverage, while positive in many respects, sheds
light on some disappointments. Claims for civil rights, intended to
transform some form of existing social order, at least with disability,
proved a poor fit when pursued on behalf of a large and amorphous
group.
But when we move away from the “big tent” conception of the
disability rights movement, things may look different. Certain con-
versations may be easier to have (even if not resolved) on behalf of
discrete communities of people with disabilities seeking to establish
or enforce specific rights. Although unification has its utility, the
196. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 921
(2008) (arguing that third party benefits should be considered in accommodation requests);
Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV.
513, 522 (2008) (proposing a vulnerability construct for ADA).
197. See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and
Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 864 (2006) (arguing that courts should interpret the ADA
to allow for class actions in employment cases).
198. For example, as evidenced most recently in the events in Ferguson, Missouri, the
criminal justice system in particular has been a locale where the public and scholars debate
and contest claims of racial inequality. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6-7 (rev. ed. 2012); Angela P. Harris,
Comments on SpearIt, “Legal Punishment as Civil Ritual: Making Cultural Sense of Harsh
Punishment,” 82 MISS. L.J. 45, 56 (2013) (“According to the backlash/frontlash account,
criminal punishment is all too rational—a strategy adopted to preserve white supremacy.”).
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conflict and category framework helps show that disability-specific
advocacy has its place.
One example of this, which I hope to explore in future work,
involves deinstitutionalization and the Supreme Court’s decision
in Olmstead v. Zimring.199 If limited conflict and ambiguous group
identity shed light on certain limits, we can alter these variables by
examining the deinstitutionalization movement, a subset of the
larger disability rights project. The deinstitutionalization move-
ment had deep roots that significantly predated the ADA. As part
of a multidimensional campaign dating back to the 1970s, those that
sought care for people with intellectual and developmental dis-
abilities in community-based settings instead of state institutions
had brought claims in federal court under both constitutional and
statutory theories, with some successes and some failures.200 They
sought to delegitimize a clear (though complicated) set of state
practices, on behalf of a discrete and understandable population,
although one with significantly less political power than the big tent
version of the disability rights community. 
As they faced powerful and organized opponents, advocates were
forced to gather allies outside the movement, and have their claims
enter contested and publicized local political environments.201 As
part of this, they were forced to continually articulate visions of
equality that supported their arguments, although the constitution-
al and statutory bases for these theories evolved over time. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead,202 holding that Title II of the
ADA contained a (qualified) integration presumption toward com-
munity-based treatment options over segregated and institutional-
ized settings, reflected this long and contentious advocacy. The
decision is unique in ADA Supreme Court cases in that it meaning-
fully confronted and considered the disability community’s vision of
equality. Admittedly, many reasons can be offered for the trajectory
199. 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999).
200. For general history of the deinstitutionalization movement, see, for example, ANN
BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION (1990);
PAUL LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (1982); MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY 166-90 (1994). 
201. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation,
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2012).
202. 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
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of the deinstitutionalization movement, and I would not offer the
more intense local conflict or clear nature of the category as the
definitive causal account of this success. But it does illuminate how
both of these features can have positive effects within the universe
of disability rights. And to the extent that this demonstrates
fragmentation and disability-specific advocacy has its place, this
may be an important contribution to real time debates on this
topic.203
CONCLUSION
Before Windsor and Obergefell, there was Bowers v. Hardwick. And
Hawaii.204 Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there was Brown v.
Board of Education. And Birmingham.205 Before Reed and Frontiero
(or at least concurrently), there was the failed ERA. Before the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act, there was no parallel publicly salient
contestation to spur evolving notions of shifting societal norms.
Unlike these other movements, there was limited conflict to help
focus the terms of the debate, highlighting differences between the
existing social order and a disability-based vision of equality that
advocates saw embedded in the ADA. Throughout, rather than cap-
turing public attention and imagination, disability rights remained
something that, relatively speaking, were important to a small
group of activists. Public and judicial attention was focused, if at all,
203. In 2013, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grams (OFCCP) announced its Final Rule for compliance with Section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act. 78 Fed. Reg. 58,682, 58,683 (Sept. 24, 2013) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt.
60-741). This new rule revised the affirmative action regulations that federal contractors have
for individuals with disabilities. Id. Specifically, this regulation established a nationwide 7
percent utilization goal for qualified individuals with disabilities, using the same definition
as the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act. Id. This could therefore give federal
contractors an incentive to urge their employees with the most marginal disabilities to self-
identify, to exclude hiring and recruiting of workers with more serious disabilities.
204. See Jeffrey J. Swart, Comment, The Wedding Luau—Who is Invited?: Hawaii, Same-
Sex Marriage, and Emerging Realities, 43 EMORY L.J. 1577, 1578 (1994) (“In May 1993, the
Hawaii Supreme Court became the first court in the history of the United States to hold that
the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex applicants may violate the state’s constitutional
guarantee of equal protection.”).
205. See Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Mont-
gomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1000 (1989) (“Protest campaigns in Birmingham and
Selma constituted crucial links in the chain of events that culminated in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.”).
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on the potentially large number of people who could be covered
under this new and possibly far-reaching statute. 
The big tent version of the disability rights movement has po-
litical power, as evidenced by its ability to get federal legislation
passed in an era in which it was difficult to do so. The disability
rights movement’s lower political salience relative to other groups
enabled it to avoid entering the culture wars and positively contrib-
uted to the movement’s ability to get things done at the federal
political level. This had its upsides: for example, the disability rights
movement was able to form strategic alliances in places where
movement goals overlapped with more pressing national inter-
ests.206 But the literature on social movements and constitutional
rights claiming, focusing on the role of conflict and contestation in
creating different understandings of law, reveals an unexplored
downside. Without a fought-for vision of equality, there is a natural
ceiling on what an ambitious law like the ADA can reasonably hope
to accomplish.
In 1997, the New York University Law Review published an essay
written by the recently deceased Thomas Stoddard, Executive Direc-
tor of Lambda Legal Defense Fund and adjunct professor at New
York University School of Law. Entitled Bleeding Heart: Reflections
on Using the Law to Make Social Change, Stoddard wrote about a
recent trip to New Zealand, a country he was excited to visit in part
because of its strong laws providing protection from discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, a state of affairs that was far
different from what existed in the United States at that time.207 To
his surprise, “[o]n paper, the country is among the most advanced
nations in the world in according rights and respect to gay people.
In the everyday life of the lesbians and gay men of New Zealand,
however, the country is not particularly advanced.”208
206. One recent example includes Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, in which several
universities were sued by copyright owners over their attempts to digitize copyrighted works
in their libraries. 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). The National Federation of the Blind intervened
in the case on the side of the libraries, arguing that electronic access was important for blind
students and scholars. This helped support the ultimate fair use holding. See id.
207. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 968 (1997). 
208. Id. at 971.
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In thinking through why this was the case, Stoddard concluded
that conflict—and the awareness it brings—was the key to true
change: 
Let me also suggest this: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has had
such a powerful cultural impact not just because of what it said,
but also because of how it came into being. The Act was the
product of a continuing passionate and informal national de-
bate of at least a decade’s duration (beginning, vaguely with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education ...)
over the state of race relations in the United States. The debate
took place every day and every night in millions of homes,
schools, and workplaces.... Through a continuing national con-
versation about race, ordinary citizens (especially white citizens)
came to see the subject of race anew.209
Similarly, “[o]rdinary citizens must know that a shift has taken
place for that shift to have cultural resonance.”210 Disability rights,
at least in the form presented in the Americans with Disabilities
Act, are different.
In this Article I have not attempted to fully operationalize this
principle in terms of what it might mean for the disability rights
movement. That will need to occur in future work, hopefully by
diverse scholars and members of the disability rights movement. It
may be that the ADA-defined conception of disability encompasses
too many groups around which to coalesce a vision of social change.
This omnibus view of disability will likely never be salient in the
same way as race, gender, or other identity groups. If so, and if
fragmentation is useful, advocates may do well to study the deinsti-
tutionalization movement and look to areas (at least initially) in
which there is potential cultural resonance.
Family law is also an area in which states often expressly dis-
criminate against people with disabilities, in a way that should be
an affront to a faithful vision of the Equal Protection Clause that
acknowledges that social judgments about people with disabilities
are not inevitable.211 As recent media accounts suggest, the ability
209. Id. at 975-76.
210. Id. at 980.
211. Some state laws expressly require consideration of mental disability in determina-
tions of parental fitness or otherwise link mental disability to a termination of parental
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to be near loved ones, and to create family units, has cultural
resonance.212 The recent trajectory of the quest for marriage equal-
ity belies the argument that it is an impossible goal to secure civil
rights gains from a conservative judiciary, and serves as a reminder
that “law that intervenes in status relationships can help unsettle
beliefs long thought reasonable.”213 An aging population, which cor-
relates highly with disability, and the fluid nature of the category
itself—it is the one minority group anyone can join at any
time—should mean over the long term that there is the possibility
for a more accepted vision of equality to take hold.214
This strategy would not accomplish all of the goals set out in the
ADA for the entire universe of people it covers. But history teaches
that advocates must exercise patience, keep their eyes on the end
game, and, at times, have a high pain threshold. Such is the nature
rights, or deny parents with mental disabilities reunification services that other parents
receive. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9100 (West 2015); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 361.5(a), (b)(2) (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-26(b) (West 2015). Other state laws
severely restrict the rights of people with mental disabilities to get married. See, e.g., KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 402.990(2) (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-109 (West 2015). In part based
on laws such as these, parents with physical and mental disabilities all too often face
proceedings to remove children from their care. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING
THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN
14 (2012), http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2012/Sep272012/ [http://perma.cc/4MWM-2Y9T]
(“Clearly, the legal system is not protecting the rights of parents with disabilities and their
children.”).
212. For a current—and sympathetic—account of people with disabilities being institu-
tionalized and having to fight for their ability to get married, see Dan Barry, A Couple
Gaining Independence, and Finding a Bond, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/10/05/us/a-couple-gaining-independence-and-finding-a-bond.html [http://perma.cc/
LR8N-3G4H].
213. See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 5, at 91.
214. A recent poll commissioned by RespectAbility, a disability rights organization, and
conducted by Democratic and Republican polling firms in Senate battleground states,
demonstrates the potential for generating increased political awareness, and contestation, of
disability issues. See DISABILITY ISSUES FOR VOTERS IN THE SENATE BATTLEGROUND, RESPECT-
ABILITY (2014), http://respectabilityusa.com/Resources/Disability%20Issues%20for%20Voters%
20in%20the%20Senate%20Battleground.pdf [http://perma.cc/VLN5-HEU2]. This poll finds
that 56 percent of voters report having a family member or close friend with a disability, while
43 percent do not. A majority of Americans (54 percent) think that the state government is
“not doing enough/not doing anywhere near enough” to “help people with disabilities get jobs
and become independent,” while 28 percent think the state is “doing more than
enough/enough.” Overall, more than half of likely voters believe the federal government is
“not doing enough/not doing anywhere near enough” to “help people with disabilities get jobs
and become independent,” while 35 percent believe it is “doing more than enough/enough.”
Id.
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of civil rights struggles that “stir[ ] the imagination of the young,
and the imagination of the free.”215 One cadre of activists and
lawyers does its part and then passes the torch on to the next gen-
eration. Setbacks, whether in the form of Supreme Court losses or
legislative failures, mobilize constituencies and create opportunities
for new coalitions, public education, and supportive media coverage.
Keeping in mind that change is intergenerational, such setbacks
also provide the opportunity for “winning through losing.”216
215. See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 5, at 76. 
216. See NeJaime, supra note 5, at 945-48.
